{"id":15810,"date":"2026-01-28T12:43:53","date_gmt":"2026-01-28T12:43:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/?p=15810"},"modified":"2026-01-28T12:43:53","modified_gmt":"2026-01-28T12:43:53","slug":"nokia-failure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/nokia-failure\/","title":{"rendered":"The Real Reasons for Nokia\u2019s Failure: A Giant That Overlooked Innovation"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Empire That Ruled the World<\/strong><\/h2>\n

At its zenith, Nokia wasn’t just a company\u2014it was a global phenomenon. The Finnish giant commanded\u00a040.5%<\/strong>\u00a0of the global mobile market in 2007, with over\u00a01.2 billion<\/strong>\u00a0people using its devices worldwide. Its signature ringtone became a cultural touchstone across continents. Yet, by 2014, this once-dominant force had virtually disappeared from the mobile landscape, its handset division sold to Microsoft for a mere\u00a0$7.2 billion<\/strong>\u2014a fraction of its former value.<\/p>\n

Nokia’s story represents one of the most dramatic business collapses in modern history, offering profound lessons about\u00a0technological disruption<\/strong>,\u00a0organizational arrogance<\/strong>, \u060c \u0648\u00a0the peril of ignoring innovation<\/strong>. This comprehensive analysis examines every facet of Nokia’s failure, providing insights relevant to today’s rapidly evolving business environment.<\/p>\n

\"The

The Real Reasons for Nokia\u2019s Failure<\/p><\/div>\n

Chapter 1: Internal Factors \u2013 The Rot Within<\/strong><\/h2>\n

1.1 Complacent Leadership and Strategic Myopia<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The Ivory Tower Syndrome<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Nokia’s leadership in the mid-2000s operated in what former employees called\u00a0“strategic isolation.”<\/strong>\u00a0Having dominated the mobile industry for nearly a decade, executives developed an unshakable belief in their own infallibility. The company’s internal culture celebrated past successes to such an extent that it blinded leadership to emerging threats.<\/p>\n

A revealing example occurred in\u00a02004<\/strong>, when Nokia engineers developed a prototype touchscreen smartphone with internet capabilities. When presented to senior management, the response was dismissive:<\/p>\n

\n

“Who would want to browse the internet on their phone? People just want to make calls and send texts.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This myopia persisted even after Apple’s iPhone launch. Nokia’s then-CEO, Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, famously remarked in 2007:<\/p>\n

\n

“The iPhone is a nice niche product, but it won’t appeal to business customers.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Paralyzing Decision-Making Structure<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Nokia suffered from what insiders termed\u00a0“matrix paralysis.”<\/strong>\u00a0The company’s complex organizational structure required multiple committees to approve even minor decisions. A former senior engineer revealed:<\/p>\n

\n

“To change a single feature on a phone, we needed approval from 14 different committees. By the time we got approval, the market had moved on.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This bureaucratic nightmare meant that while Apple could design and launch a new iPhone in 12-18 months, Nokia’s development cycles stretched to\u00a02-3 years<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

1.2 Toxic Organizational Culture<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The Climate of Fear<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Nokia’s culture became increasingly toxic as its market dominance grew. Middle managers were terrified of delivering bad news upward, creating what psychologists call\u00a0“organizational silence.”<\/strong>\u00a0A 2009 internal survey revealed that\u00a068%<\/strong>\u00a0of employees felt they couldn’t voice concerns without career repercussions.<\/p>\n

Former VP of Design, Frank Nuovo, described the environment:<\/p>\n

\n

“There were brilliant ideas everywhere, but they died in meetings. People were more concerned with protecting their positions than with innovating.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The Not-Invented-Here Syndrome<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Nokia’s engineers developed an arrogance about their technical capabilities. When Google approached Nokia in 2007 about adopting Android, Nokia’s executives famously responded:<\/p>\n

\n

“We don’t need Android. We have Symbian, which powers 70% of smartphones. Why would we help Google?”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This arrogance extended to dismissing entire categories of innovation. Nokia’s head of marketing told his team in 2008:<\/p>\n

\n

“App stores are a fad. Consumers want complete devices, not platforms.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Departmental Silos and Internal Warfare<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Nokia’s various divisions operated as competing fiefdoms rather than collaborative units. The hardware, software, and services teams actively sabotaged each other’s initiatives. An infamous incident involved the\u00a0Ovi Store<\/strong>\u00a0(Nokia’s app store), which the services team developed without input from software engineers. The result was a dysfunctional platform that launched\u00a018 months late<\/strong>\u00a0and never gained traction.<\/p>\n

\"Nokia\"

Nokia<\/p><\/div>\n

1.3 The Symbian Albatross<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Technological Debt and Legacy Code<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Symbian, Nokia’s mobile operating system, was originally designed for basic feature phones. As smartphone capabilities expanded, Symbian became what engineers called\u00a0“a house of cards”<\/strong>\u2014millions of lines of spaghetti code that couldn’t support modern features.<\/p>\n

Despite internal warnings dating back to\u00a02003<\/strong>, management refused to invest in a new platform. An internal 2006 memo stated:<\/p>\n

\n

“Symbian is our moat. Replacing it would be admitting defeat.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

By 2010, developing new features on Symbian took\u00a05 times longer<\/strong>\u00a0than on iOS or Android.<\/p>\n

The MeeGo Debacle<\/strong><\/h4>\n

When Nokia finally recognized Symbian’s limitations, it created\u00a0MeeGo<\/strong>\u2014a modern operating system developed with Intel. However, internal politics doomed the project. The Symbian team, fearing obsolescence, actively undermined MeeGo’s development. The platform launched with only\u00a057 apps<\/strong>\u00a0compared to Apple’s\u00a0300,000+<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

Chapter 2: External Factors \u2013 The Perfect Storm<\/strong><\/h2>\n

2.1 The Smartphone Revolution<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Apple’s Disruptive Innovation<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Steve Jobs didn’t just release a new phone in 2007; he introduced a new\u00a0paradigm<\/strong>. The iPhone wasn’t a better phone\u2014it was a different category of device entirely. While Nokia focused on incremental improvements (better cameras, longer battery life), Apple redefined what a mobile device could be.<\/p>\n

Nokia’s initial response was telling. The day after the iPhone launch, Nokia’s board met and concluded:<\/p>\n

\n

“No serious threat. The iPhone lacks physical keyboard, has poor battery life, and costs too much.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This fundamental misunderstanding of the iPhone’s value proposition\u2014the ecosystem, user experience, and developer platform\u2014sealed Nokia’s fate.<\/p>\n

Android’s Democratic Revolution<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Google’s Android offered what Symbian couldn’t: a\u00a0free, open-source platform<\/strong>\u00a0that manufacturers could customize. While Nokia charged phone makers\u00a0$15 per device<\/strong>\u00a0for Symbian licenses, Google offered Android for free. By 2010, Android had captured\u00a033%<\/strong>\u00a0of the smartphone market to Nokia’s\u00a031%<\/strong>\u2014the first time Nokia wasn’t leading.<\/p>\n

2.2 The Platform Economy Shift<\/strong><\/h3>\n

From Devices to Ecosystems<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The 2008-2012 period marked a fundamental shift from\u00a0product competition<\/strong>\u00a0\u0628\u0647\u00a0ecosystem competition<\/strong>. Apple and Google weren’t just selling phones; they were building platforms where apps, services, and devices created network effects.<\/p>\n

Nokia’s leadership failed to grasp this shift. CEO Stephen Elop’s now-infamous\u00a0“Burning Platform”<\/strong>\u00a0memo in 2011 acknowledged the problem but came three years too late:<\/p>\n

\n

“Our competitors aren’t taking our market share with devices; they’re taking it with an entire ecosystem.”<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The Developer Exodus<\/strong><\/h4>\n

As iOS and Android attracted developers, Symbian’s ecosystem collapsed. Between 2009 and 2011,\u00a093%<\/strong>\u00a0of Symbian developers abandoned the platform. Without apps, Nokia’s smartphones became increasingly unattractive, creating a\u00a0death spiral<\/strong>\u00a0from which recovery was impossible.<\/p>\n

2.3 Asian Manufacturing Onslaught<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Samsung’s Agile Response<\/strong><\/h4>\n

While Nokia deliberated in committee meetings, Samsung made decisive moves. The Korean giant recognized Android’s potential early and launched\u00a030 different smartphone models<\/strong>\u00a0in 2010 alone. Samsung’s vertical integration (it manufactured its own components) allowed faster iteration and lower costs.<\/p>\n

Chinese Price Competition<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Companies like Huawei and Xiaomi entered the market with\u00a0“good enough”<\/strong>\u00a0smartphones at half Nokia’s prices. By 2013, Chinese manufacturers controlled\u00a035%<\/strong>\u00a0of the global smartphone market.<\/p>\n

\n

Chapter 3: Timeline of Collapse \u2013 The Unfolding Tragedy<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\"Timeline

Timeline of Nokia\u2019s Downfall<\/p><\/div>\n

Phase 1: The Peak of Power (2006-2007)<\/strong><\/h3>\n
    \n
  • \n

    2006:<\/strong>\u00a0Nokia ships its\u00a01 billionth<\/strong>\u00a0phone<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Market share:<\/strong>\u00a048.7% globally<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Revenue:<\/strong>\u00a0\u20ac41 billion<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Perception:<\/strong>\u00a0Invincible market leader<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Phase 2: The First Cracks (2007-2009)<\/strong><\/h3>\n
      \n
    • \n

      June 2007:<\/strong>\u00a0iPhone launches; Nokia dismisses it<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      October 2008:<\/strong>\u00a0Android launches; Nokia ignores it<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      2009 Q4:<\/strong>\u00a0Nokia’s smartphone market share drops to\u00a038%<\/strong>\u00a0(from 50% in 2007)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Internal crisis:<\/strong>\u00a0First major layoffs (1,700 employees)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Phase 3: The Descent (2010-2011)<\/strong><\/h3>\n
        \n
      • \n

        September 2010:<\/strong>\u00a0Stephen Elop becomes CEO<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        February 2011:<\/strong>\u00a0“Burning Platform” memo leaks<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        February 2011:<\/strong>\u00a0Nokia announces partnership with Microsoft, abandons Symbian<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        Market share collapse:<\/strong>\u00a0Drops to\u00a015%<\/strong>\u00a0by end of 2011<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        Phase 4: The Death Spiral (2012-2014)<\/strong><\/h3>\n
          \n
        • \n

          2012:<\/strong>\u00a0Windows Phone fails to gain traction (<3% market share)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          2013 Q2:<\/strong>\u00a0Nokia loses title of largest phone vendor after\u00a014 years<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          September 2013:<\/strong>\u00a0Microsoft acquires Nokia’s mobile division for\u00a0$7.2 billion<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          2014:<\/strong>\u00a0Nokia brand disappears from mobile phones<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          \n

          Chapter 4: Key Quotes That Define the Tragedy<\/strong><\/h2>\n

          From Leadership:<\/strong><\/h3>\n
          \n

          “We’re not in the smartphone business; we’re in the mobile phone business.”<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Nokia Board Member, 2008<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

          \n

          “The iPhone won’t make a dent in our market. It’s too expensive for normal people.”<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Nokia Marketing Director, 2007<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

          From Engineers:<\/strong><\/h3>\n
          \n

          “We had touchscreen prototypes in 2004, but management said ‘real phones have buttons.'”<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Former Nokia R&D Lead<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

          \n

          “Symbian wasn’t just outdated; it was actively hostile to modern development.”<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Ex-Nokia Software Architect<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

          The Infamous “Burning Platform” Memo Excerpts:<\/strong><\/h3>\n
          \n

          “We have multiple points of scorching heat that are fuelling a blazing fire around us… The first iPhone shipped in 2007, and we still don’t have a product that is close to their experience.”<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Stephen Elop, 2011<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

          \n

          Chapter 5: The Human Element \u2013 Cultural Anthropology of Failure<\/strong><\/h2>\n

          The Finnish Identity Crisis<\/strong><\/h3>\n

          Nokia wasn’t just a company; it was\u00a0Finland’s national champion<\/strong>. At its peak, Nokia accounted for\u00a04%<\/strong>\u00a0of Finland’s GDP and\u00a021%<\/strong>\u00a0of its exports. This national significance created additional pressure and institutional inertia. The government couldn’t let Nokia fail, creating a\u00a0“too big to fail”<\/strong>\u00a0mentality that delayed necessary radical changes.<\/p>\n

          The Stockholm Syndrome of Success<\/strong><\/h3>\n

          Employees who joined Nokia during its golden era developed what organizational psychologists call\u00a0“success-induced blindness.”<\/strong>\u00a0Past achievements created cognitive filters that dismissed contradictory information. Even as market data showed declining sales, internal narratives focused on\u00a0“temporary setbacks”<\/strong>\u00a0rather than existential threats.<\/p>\n

          The Generational Divide<\/strong><\/h3>\n

          Younger engineers recognized the smartphone revolution, but lacked organizational power. A 2010 internal survey showed:<\/p>\n

            \n
          • \n

            85%<\/strong>\u00a0of engineers under 30 believed Nokia needed radical change<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

          • \n

            Only 23%<\/strong>\u00a0of executives over 50 agreed<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

            This generational disconnect meant innovative ideas never reached decision-makers.<\/p>\n

            \n

            Chapter 6: Comparative Analysis \u2013 Why Others Survived<\/strong><\/h2>\n

            Apple vs. Nokia: The Innovation Mindset<\/strong><\/h3>\n

            While Nokia focused on\u00a0incremental improvement<\/strong>\u00a0(more durable phones, better battery life), Apple pursued\u00a0paradigm shifts<\/strong>. Apple’s organizational structure\u2014small, focused teams with direct executive access\u2014allowed rapid iteration that Nokia’s bureaucracy couldn’t match.<\/p>\n

            Samsung vs. Nokia: The Agile Response<\/strong><\/h3>\n

            Samsung’s key advantage wasn’t technological superiority but\u00a0organizational agility<\/strong>. Where Nokia took years to approve new models, Samsung could launch multiple products simultaneously, rapidly learning from market feedback.<\/p>\n

            Microsoft’s Mobile Failure vs. Nokia’s<\/strong><\/h3>\n

            Interestingly, Microsoft also failed in mobile, but for different reasons. While Nokia suffered from\u00a0technological lag<\/strong>, Microsoft suffered from\u00a0strategic confusion<\/strong>\u2014constantly changing direction between Windows Mobile, Windows Phone, and Windows 10 Mobile.<\/p>\n

            \n

            Chapter 7: The Aftermath and Legacy<\/strong><\/h2>\n

            What Happened to Nokia?<\/strong><\/h3>\n
              \n
            • \n

              Mobile Division:<\/strong>\u00a0Sold to Microsoft in 2014 (Microsoft wrote off\u00a0$7.6 billion<\/strong>\u00a0of the acquisition value in 2015)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

            • \n

              Remaining Company:<\/strong>\u00a0Focused on telecommunications infrastructure (Nokia Networks)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

            • \n

              Brand Licensing:<\/strong>\u00a0HMD Global now licenses the Nokia brand for smartphones<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

            • \n

              Current Status:<\/strong>\u00a0Profitable but nowhere near former glory<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

              The Human Cost<\/strong><\/h3>\n
                \n
              • \n

                35,000+<\/strong>\u00a0employees lost jobs globally<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

              • \n

                Finland’s<\/strong>\u00a0unemployment rose from 6% to 9% during Nokia’s collapse<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

              • \n

                Economic Impact:<\/strong>\u00a0Finland’s GDP growth turned negative in 2012-2013<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                The Surprising Survivor: Nokia Technologies<\/strong><\/h3>\n

                One division survived relatively intact:\u00a0Nokia Technologies<\/strong>, which manages the company’s patent portfolio. With\u00a020,000+ patents<\/strong>, Nokia earns over\u00a0\u20ac1.5 billion annually<\/strong>\u00a0from licensing\u2014a poignant reminder of its innovative past.<\/p>\n

                \n

                Chapter 8: Modern Business Lessons \u2013 Preventing Your Nokia Moment<\/strong><\/h2>\n

                Lesson 1: Cultivate Strategic Paranoia<\/strong><\/h3>\n
                \n

                “Success breeds complacency. Complacency breeds failure.”<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Andy Grove, Intel<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

                Modern companies must institutionalize\u00a0“healthy paranoia”<\/strong>\u2014regularly challenging assumptions, actively seeking disconfirming evidence, and rewarding employees who identify threats.<\/p>\n

                Lesson 2: Structure for Speed, Not Stability<\/strong><\/h3>\n

                Hierarchical structures optimized for stable markets fail in disruptive environments. Modern organizations need:<\/p>\n

                  \n
                • \n

                  Small, autonomous teams<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                • \n

                  Rapid decision cycles<\/strong>\u00a0(days, not months)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                • \n

                  Direct communication channels<\/strong>\u00a0bypassing bureaucracy<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                  Lesson 3: Platforms Over Products<\/strong><\/h3>\n

                  The Nokia-Apple contrast demonstrates the power shift from\u00a0product excellence<\/strong>\u00a0\u0628\u0647\u00a0ecosystem dominance<\/strong>. Modern businesses must think in terms of:<\/p>\n

                    \n
                  • \n

                    Network effects<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                  • \n

                    Developer communities<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                  • \n

                    Cross-platform integration<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                    Lesson 4: Cultural Renewal as Strategic Imperative<\/strong><\/h3>\n

                    Organizational culture isn’t a “soft” issue\u2014it’s a strategic one. Companies must:<\/p>\n

                      \n
                    • \n

                      Measure cultural health<\/strong>\u00a0quantitatively<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                    • \n

                      Rotate leadership<\/strong>\u00a0to prevent stagnation<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                    • \n

                      Create psychological safety<\/strong>\u00a0for dissent<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                      Lesson 5: The Innovation Portfolio Approach<\/strong><\/h3>\n

                      Relying on a single technology (like Symbian) creates existential risk. Successful modern companies maintain:<\/p>\n

                        \n
                      • \n

                        Core innovation<\/strong>\u00a0(incremental improvements to existing products)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                      • \n

                        Adjacent innovation<\/strong>\u00a0(expanding into related markets)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

                      • \n

                        Transformational innovation<\/strong>\u00a0(betting on new paradigms)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                        \n

                        Chapter 9: The Philosophical Dimension \u2013 What Nokia Teaches Us About Progress<\/strong><\/h2>\n

                        Nokia’s story represents more than a business failure; it illustrates fundamental truths about\u00a0technological evolution<\/strong>\u00a0\u0648\u00a0human psychology<\/strong>. The company fell victim to what historian Arnold Toynbee called\u00a0“the idolization of an ephemeral technique.”<\/strong>\u00a0Nokia worshiped its past success formula long after it had become obsolete.<\/p>\n

                        The tragedy also demonstrates the\u00a0pace of change acceleration<\/strong>. Nokia dominated mobile for\u00a014 years<\/strong>\u00a0(1996-2010). Apple has dominated smartphones for\u00a016 years<\/strong>\u00a0(2007-present). The next disruption will likely happen even faster.<\/p>\n

                        \n

                        Conclusion: The Eternal Vigilance of Innovation<\/strong><\/h2>\n

                        Nokia’s collapse wasn’t inevitable. At multiple points between 2004 and 2010, different decisions could have changed the outcome. The real tragedy isn’t that Nokia failed, but that it\u00a0had the resources, talent, and market position to succeed<\/strong>\u00a0and still failed.<\/p>\n

                        The ultimate lesson transcends business strategy:\u00a0In a world of exponential change, adaptability isn’t an advantage\u2014it’s a prerequisite for survival.<\/strong>\u00a0Nokia’s story reminds us that no market position is secure, no technology permanent, and no success formula timeless.<\/p>\n

                        As we enter an era of AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology, Nokia’s ghost whispers a warning to today’s tech giants:\u00a0Complacency is the only fatal error. Innovation isn’t something you achieve; it’s something you maintain, daily, through relentless self-criticism and courageous adaptation.<\/strong><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                        The Empire That Ruled the World At its zenith, Nokia wasn’t just a company\u2014it was a global phenomenon. The Finnish<\/p>","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":15813,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[824],"tags":[825],"class_list":["post-15810","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-companies-rise-and-fall","tag-nokia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15810","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15810"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15810\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15813"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15810"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15810"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tendify.net\/fa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15810"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}